by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira
The honorable posthumous award of the title Citizen of São Paulo—granted only days ago by the São Paulo City Council in memory of the late “comrade” Salvador Allende, the ill-fated president of Chile—could not help but have the most unfavorable effects on public opinion across the country. That regrettable decision was approved by secret ballot.
Of course, the discontent stirred throughout the country is much less visible than the discontent of equal strength that would erupt if the same measure offended the sensibilities of the left. Still, left-leaning readers should not let this relative quiet mislead them about the real and widespread displeasure caused by our City Council’s action. Centrists and right-wingers are—each in their own way—people of order.
The very nature of those who value order is not to express their displeasure through agitation or disorder. Such methods are the exclusive language of the partisans of anarchy, chaos, and violence. An orderly person’s indignation manifests itself in dignified protest—calm, self-assured, and ready to contend when necessary. It is a gentlemanly struggle, the diametric opposite of the aggressive and vulgar posturing of strike pickets, of “occupations” that damage the property of others, and of similar forms of coercive protest.
Compelling reasons justify the displeasure and indignation this civic “canonization” of Allende has sparked.
Indeed, no one in our country—or anywhere in the free world—can deny that, during 1970–1973, the ill-fated Chilean leader was among the most prominent figures linked to the broader communist push in the Ibero-American region. A rapid and extensive implementation of Marxist ideas characterized his government.
This caused a string of disasters for his unfortunate country—disasters that, as a typical result of state capitalism, pushed many of the wealthy into poverty and left most of the poor in complete destitution.
The reader should not interpret these statements as a hollow or irritable outburst of doctrinal hostility from an organization like the TFP, which is well known for its anticommunist convictions.
High-level, substantive, and courteous debate has always characterized this organization. Throughout its extensive publications in books, magazines, and newspapers, it has consistently upheld these standards and carefully documented its assertions.
In the eyes of the public, bestowing this honor is an unjustified endorsement—both in principle and in practice—of the hardships, deprivations, and failures faced by the Chilean people under that fiery far-left leader’s rule. Furthermore, the sympathy from those who now offer posthumous support for his work will inevitably be seen as an endorsement of the fundamentally anti-Christian principles that motivated it.
I would like to believe that most members of our City Council who voted to grant posthumous São Paulo citizenship to the ill-fated Chilean leader are unaware of the many evils his administration—shaped by socialist-communist influence—brought upon that unfortunate nation, which had been entrusted to his care through a disastrous coalition between Christian Democrats and the left.
I will now provide a list (which, if complete, would take up much more space) of the facts that demonstrate the persecutory and destructive nature of his disastrous administration.
I note that the few facts not documented in this list are well-known publicly in Chile.
Let the reader judge for himself the folly of the late President’s secular and civic “canonization.”
-
Agrarian Reform — With its implementation, agricultural production in the 1971–72 crop year fell by 3.6%; in 1972–73, the decline reached 13.7% (see Carlos Patrício del Campo, Private Property and Free Enterprise in the Agro‑Reformist Typhoon, Ed. Vera Cruz, São Paulo, 1985, p. 141).
-
Decline in Wheat Production — Wheat output fell by nearly half: from 1,367,974 tons in the 1970–71 agricultural year to 749,684 tons in 1972–73 (see Ercilla, Santiago, August 10, 1977). By the end of the Allende administration, the country no longer produced sufficient wheat for its own population. Bread was made with “black flour”—that is, with fibrous material normally excluded from flour production because it is indigestible to humans and poses serious health risks (see Prof. Fernando Monckeberg Barros, an internationally renowned nutrition specialist, in Fiducia, Santiago, May 1974).
-
General Rationing — In April 1972, Allende established the JAPs (Supply and Price Boards), which issued ration cards to those who registered with them. Only with this card could one purchase food outside the black market: one kilo of sugar every fifteen days, and half a kilo of meat every two months.
-
Hunger — To confront the growing problem of hunger, Bosco Parra, Secretary‑General of the “Christian Left” group, proposed to Allende’s Minister of Agriculture, Jacques Chonchol, the adoption of a “basic egalitarian consumption for the entire population” (El Mercurio, 8/21/1972).
-
Allende‑Supporting Myths — The “Christians for Socialism” group in Antofagasta went so far as to defend starvation itself, claiming that “Christians do not fear fasting; they are familiar with it” (Folha de S. Paulo, Sept. 10, 1972). And the Women’s Federation of the Socialist Party even recommended that socialist women abstain from eating beef for an entire year (see O Jornal, Rio de Janeiro, 9/30/1972).
-
Strikes and Land Occupations — With the onset of agrarian unrest between 1960 and 1966—well before Allende’s rise—there were strikes on 827 farms and 36 land occupations. By 1970, at the close of the Frei administration and the beginning of Allende’s, these numbers had risen to 1,127 strikes and 48 invasions. In 1971, they surged dramatically to 1,758 strikes and 1,278 invasions (see Carlos Patrício del Campo, op. cit., p. 142).
-
Expropriations — By the end of the Allende administration in 1973, 5,809 farms had been expropriated, totaling 10 million hectares—representing 47% of productive land and 60% of irrigated land.
-
Serfs — The government did not grant a single individual land title to the peasants supposedly “benefiting” from the Agrarian Reform (see Ercilla, August 10, 1977). To those peasants who, deluded, expected the government to give them a plot of land, it was Allende’s own Minister of Agriculture, Jacques Chonchol, who delivered the warning: “I want you to understand clearly that there will be no distribution of individual land ownership” (El Mercurio, 1/31/71).
-
Unpopularity — The unpopularity of the Agrarian Reform among the peasants was acknowledged by the Communist Party’s Central Committee itself. Commenting on the defeat suffered by the left in agricultural regions during a special election in 1972, it declared: “One of the setbacks that should concern us most is the one we suffered in the countryside. … We expropriated like no other government and suffered a setback in the countryside” (El Mercurio, 2/3/1972).
-
Decline in Work — The Minister of Agriculture admitted in 1972: “We do not have the resources to make the expropriated land productive” (El Mercurio, Aug. 26, 1972). He further acknowledged that in some settlements workers labored only five hours a day (see Portada, Santiago, No. 25, Nov. 1971). The General Secretary of the Communist Party, Senator Luis Corvalán, reported to the Party that disorder in the settlements had led, among other consequences, to a resurgence of alcoholism (see El Siglo, the Communist Party’s newspaper, Aug. 14, 1972). In the 1971–72 agricultural year, the settlements cultivated only 19% of their usable land (see Carlos Patrício del Campo, op. cit., p. 142).
-
Staffing Inflation — The Ministry of Agriculture alone employed as many as 24,000 staff members, amounting to four employees for every expropriated farm and one for every three “settled” peasant families (see Ercilla, Aug. 10, 1977).
-
Persecution of Landowners — The persecution of landowners became overt. Thus, Ronaldo Calderón, who succeeded Chonchol as Minister of Agriculture, declared: “We harbor class hatred, and this class (of rural landowners) will disappear” (El Mercurio, February 9, 1973).
-
Business Reform — Under the Frei administration, 51% of the shares in the major copper mines had already passed into state hands. Allende nationalized the remaining 49%. During his administration, 40% of industrial companies and approximately 80% of the banking system were likewise brought under state control.
-
Inflation — To stimulate domestic demand, the government sharply expanded the money supply, which grew by 390% in 1973 (see Álvaro Bardón et al., A Decade of Economic Changes). The fiscal deficit rose from 10.4% of public spending in 1970 to 34.3% in 1971, 41.8% in 1972, and 55% in 1973 (see Carlos Patrício del Campo, Chile 1987: Olvidos y confusiones amenazan la propiedad privada y la libre iniciativa, p. 16). In 1971, 1972, and 1973, the balance of payments registered deficits of $299.8 million, $280.8 million, and $112.1 million, respectively. International reserves fell from $394 million in 1970 to $76 million in 1972 (see ibid., p. 17). Inflation ultimately surpassed 500% (see ibid., p. 45).
-
Fall in Wages — After an illusory rise in the average wage—from $87.80 to $102.10 in 1971—it fell to $82.10 in 1972 and collapsed to $44.10 in 1973 (see O Estado de S. Paulo, Jan. 18, 1987).
-
Crime — Allende’s first act in office was to release MIR terrorists imprisoned for common crimes such as robbery and murder, while also granting a broad amnesty to prisoners in general. Former inmates were admitted into the Civil Police, and the Carabineros’ mobile unit, specialized in maintaining public order, was disbanded.
-
Censorship — The newspaper El Mercurio and its influential media group were subjected to sustained pressure, including persecution of the owners’ personal assets and intrusive investigations into the company’s finances. The Zig‑Zag publishing house was placed under state control following labor disputes, and the same occurred with numerous radio stations, leaving the government in control of more than ninety nationwide, over half of those then in existence. Allende repeatedly abused the press law against his opponents, filing continuous lawsuits, arresting anti‑communist journalists, and temporarily suspending media outlets. The government’s scandalous campaign to seize the Companhia Manufatureira de Papéis e Cartões—the country’s sole producer of newsprint—drew international attention.
-
The Judiciary and the Legislature Turn Against Allende — As the Allende government imposed its socialist measures, it committed an increasing number of illegal acts, including the so‑called “Decrees of Insistence,” abuses of the press law, and irregularities in the appointment of ministers. As a result, the Supreme Court of Justice declared—first on May 25 and again on June 25, 1973—that the Executive Branch had deviated from the laws and the Constitution. On August 22, 1973, the Chamber of Deputies likewise declared the Allende government “illegal due to conscious and repeated violations of the Constitution.” Similar judgments were issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic and by the Chilean Bar Association.
-
Soviet Russia Draining Chile — Allende handed over the fishing quotas of the nationalized fishing companies to large Soviet vessels. In 1973, as a result of these agreements, the Russians began constructing a port in Colcura Bay, south of Santiago—ostensibly a commercial facility, but in reality little more than a base for warships. The Soviet embassy in Santiago occupied six or seven buildings and operated more than fifty vehicles. Russian technicians employed by the construction firm KPB were, in fact, Soviet officers who were training guerrillas in the town of El Belloto.
-
Fidel Backs Allende — In late 1971, Fidel Castro arrived in Santiago aboard a Soviet aircraft and traveled the length and breadth of Chile like a triumphant leader. For twenty-five days, he participated in political rallies and publicly advised Allende and his ministers on domestic policy, encouraging the revolution in every possible way. The Cuban dictator proclaimed: “The Chilean and Cuban revolutions are united” (Folha de S. Paulo, 11/14/71). A monument to “Che” Guevara was unveiled. Photographs show the vehicles serving as the escort for Allende and Castro, with guerrilla bodyguards raising their weapons in the air in a gesture reminiscent of Fidel’s entry into Havana. At the conclusion of his visit, during a large public rally in Santiago, Castro harshly rebuked members of the Allende government for failing to mobilize the people as he had done in Cuba. In fact, the stadium where the rally was held was nearly empty.