“Right Now, Immediately!” – Folha de S. Paulo, April 29, 1982

by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

Today, I want to address Anglo-Argentine tensions and first express my support for the clear, insightful, and sharp statement issued by the Argentine TFP on the topic (Folha de S. Paulo, 4/16/1982, p. 7).

In the current tension over the Falkland Islands, what worries me as a Catholic, as a Brazilian, and as a man of tradition is not the dispute between England and Argentina. Instead, it is the realization of the tragic fragility of the entire West in the face of Soviet imperialism. The simple presence of a Russian naval force in the South Atlantic at this crucial moment challenges the great and beloved South American nation, Argentina, and the esteemed and venerable European and global power, England. This is an immediate concern. In the medium term, it could destabilize all of South America, including my Brazil, and push the American and Russian superpowers toward nuclear war. The West has fallen into this state of weakness because of the disastrous Carter administration and the policy of détente with Moscow pursued by the United States and the Vatican.

The true essence of the détente between the White House and the Vatican was a loosening of control. Yet, the Soviets did not ‘relax.’ A unilateral easing of control can only lead to the downfall of those who loosen it. This dynamic has brought us to the current situation with the Russian naval presence near the Falklands. My sympathies, therefore, do not rest solely with England or Argentina but rather with both England and Argentina united against Soviet Russia. Paradoxical? Far from it.

1. In the current situation, it appears especially difficult for the British Empire to relinquish control of the Falklands. Doing so would signal a failure to defend imperial interests elsewhere where similar issues arise. For instance, Venezuela claims more than half of what was once British Guiana. Venezuelan support for Argentina was recently demonstrated with strong enthusiasm, leaving little doubt about President Herrera Campins’ plan to occupy the claimed territory as soon as possible. So, what will be the British response? Another withdrawal? If so, will it take Spain long to attack Gibraltar next? And where will all this lead? Regardless of opinions about the legitimacy of British claims and the rights of the Commonwealth to these and other possessions, one thing cannot be expected of the British government: that it retreat in the face of such claims.

Nor can Argentina, Venezuela, or Spain be asked to abandon their traditional claims. However, it is unavoidable to discuss the timing of Argentina’s military occupation at this moment. A Soviet naval force is present in the area, severely threatening Argentina’s sovereignty over its mainland territory. Let me clarify.

2. Did the Argentine occupation of the Falklands have to happen precisely when a Soviet naval force was in the area?

It is not surprising that England is resisting and going on the counteroffensive. Therefore, it seems—at least to those without special military knowledge—that Argentina will struggle to defend itself effectively without relying on the questionable support of the Russian navy. If that occurs, the Soviets will inevitably impose conditions that might include a Russian condominium over the Falklands (and then Argentina will have essentially lost those islands) and the involvement of the Argentine left in the government, with a hidden erosion of Argentine sovereignty.

There is even more. The twists and turns of an Anglo-Russian war on Argentine seas and land could easily result in Russian troops entering under the pretext of defending Argentina against British invasions. In this scenario, who would benefit once the British troops leave the country?

In short, what would the Argentine government have done to quickly remove the British from the Falklands? a) the Soviets themselves would establish a presence in the Falklands; b) then, they would naturally land in Argentina, settle there, and force the Argentine government to accept Russian puppets in the country’s leadership.

I question whether it was worth it for Argentina to pay such a steep political price to quickly assert its rights over the Falklands. The issue isn’t the Falklands themselves; it’s the urgency of enforcement. As a friend of Argentina, where I have many of the best friends I’ve ever had, as a Catholic, and as a Brazilian, I can only say, “It was not worth it.”

3. What does this have to do with me as a Brazilian? Some Argentinians might ask. A lot…

If the grim, though not unlikely, scenarios I have just described were to occur, there is no doubt that a wave of enthusiasm and hope would sweep across Brazil, bringing with it the worst ideological miasmas. It would bolster our weak political left, the squalid Brazilian Communist Party, but also the religious left, which is highly influential in the CNBB and thus in Brazil.

And if only that were all!

A whole sector of our upper bourgeoisie—meaning the wealthiest classes—is today inclined toward a form of socio-economic self-destruction. Influenced by the complaints of leftist demagoguery, its members promote discouragement and the old saying of “yield some so as not to lose it all” when faced with left-wing demands. In short, they sympathize with everything that contributes to their own downfall. And, in a perfect balance, they cast their votes with the coldest superficial detachment—and at the same time with the most passionate inner fervor—against those who identify as traditionalists or even modestly conservative. How is it that these sectors—whether religious or business-oriented—have come to work, consciously or not, for the capitulation of the healthiest elements of the wealthy bourgeoisie, and even more so of the middle and small bourgeoisie, and even more so of that broad conservative class which, in Brazil, includes urban and rural manual workers?

I am rushing through my presentation because I am running out of space. In summary, I would say that similar phenomena could occur on a larger or smaller scale throughout the Spanish Americas. Soviet imperialism might turn Ibero-America into a huge Vietnam, forcing the United States to intervene for its own protection.

Would it be worthwhile to pave the way, in the immediate, medium, and slightly longer-than-medium term, for the collapse of Argentine sovereignty, followed by that of Ibero-America, and ultimately that of world peace? And all this, not so Argentina might have the Falklands, which could be reclaimed at a more opportune moment, but so it might have them now, right now, immediately?