Hypotheses, Hypotheses… – Folha de S. Paulo, May 22, 1982

by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

I find mysterious aspects in every part of the Anglo-Argentine conflict.

1. Since the diplomatic dispute between Buenos Aires and London over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands has lasted since 1833, why would President Galtieri choose this particular moment to order their invasion? Wouldn’t the economic crisis in his noble nation suggest, on the contrary, that he should avoid such an action?

2. Supporters of General Galtieri living in Brazil have argued that, given the severe instability of his government, he had no better choice than to rally Argentine patriotism around him through a significant foreign action. Imagine if this were an explanation. Could it serve as a defense? If someone tried to defend me with such arguments, I would prosecute my “defender” for slander. Would it be appropriate for a leader to take his country into war, risking dragging the entire world into tragedy, just to extend his hold on power?

3. Why then did he act? – The only explanation I can find is to say that Argentina has better chances of victory than one might think. What are they? Two come to mind:

a) Suppose Argentina had nuclear bombs. What would it do with them? Send a plane to drop them on London? Would it be humane to kill countless lives over a rocky, frozen archipelago? How terrible would God’s and mankind’s curse be on anyone who did such a thing?

There’s more. If the coup failed because of the strength of the British defense system, what devastating consequences would Buenos Aires face? Would General Galtieri want to put his beautiful and grand capital at such risk? I find it hard to believe so.

b) So, the current Argentine government needs to find another way to support its position on the Falklands. And the idea of Soviet aid comes to mind.

However, in this case, the Argentine TFP’s statement (La Nación, April 13, 1982, reproduced in Folha de S. Paulo, April 16, 1982) and my telegram to President J. B. Figueiredo, on behalf of the Brazilian TFP (Folha de S. Paulo, May 7, 1982), clarified that Russian landing forces could set foot on Argentina’s mainland and never leave. This would seriously risk triggering a resurgence of communist terrorism, guerrilla warfare, unrest, and upheaval across the South American continent.

Does President Galtieri not realize that this possibility raises objections, mistrust, and fears regarding his policy, which a Russian landing would only worsen? In Catholic Argentina, such a landing could easily spark a religious war to remove the atheist invaders. This is similar to how the fights of Pernambucans to drive out the Calvinist Dutch from Brazil turned into a religious conflict.

The Moscow-provoked turmoil would prompt anticommunist reactions across the continent to take on the same nuance as a religious struggle.

General Galtieri should not assume under any circumstances that he will be chosen by popular support as the commander of this war, as his inexplicable and unfathomable gesture could have opened the gates of the continent to communist invasion.

4. In this context, it’s important to point out another puzzling aspect of current events.

If communist Russia is supporting General Galtieri, it is fair to say that anyone could be expected to accept this support… except, specifically, General Galtieri, who has led a strong anticommunist crackdown since taking office. Yet he now appears, arm in arm, on friendly visits with communist ambassadors from satellite countries. At the same time, he receives affection and praise from the Beijing government and allows the return of exiled Montoneros, while also cooperating with all Peronist and leftist groups in Argentina. What is the meaning of so many “vueltas y vuelteretas” (twists and turns)?

5. In reality, the Argentine government has responded that it is “not considering” asking for Russian help. A curious denial, which almost seems like an indirect confirmation. In fact, the words quoted in quotation marks do not rule out the possibility that tomorrow he may consider it. For, obviously, what a man is “not considering” doing, he may do the next day.

What is clear from all of this? Nothing, except the existence of a terrible mystery filled with great confusion.

At this point, limited space compels me to conclude.

I do this by proposing some hypotheses: let us assume that, with the goal of Vietnamizing South America, Moscow ignited the powder keg by manipulating General Galtieri’s patriotism into the attack on the Falklands. A possible Russian landing on Argentine territory would have been limited, as the Argentine TFP’s communiqué warned the country’s Catholic opinion. Nonetheless, even so, the Vietnamization plan would not have been halted.

Recently, newspapers have reported—amid affirmations and denials—that Venezuela has made an incursion into the area it claims from former British Guiana. Additionally, Peru’s longstanding territorial claim against Chile has been reignited, as Peruvian planes will now monitor the Argentine-Chilean border. Meanwhile, the relevant Argentine planes will be sent to the Falklands front.

A wave of wars would therefore spread across South America, accompanied by economic crises and social revolutions. Colombia’s territorial claims against Venezuela and Ecuador’s against Peru are barely dormant…

Yes, these are hypotheses, but they have a disturbingly convincing tone. And they would clearly explain how, by repeating the Falklands maneuver along the Pacific coast, Moscow might hope to Vietnamize the entire continent.